This paper asks whether inflation targeting improves economic performance, as measured by the behavior of inflation, output, and interest rates. We compare seven OECD countries that adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s to thirteen that did not. After the early 90s, performance improved along many dimensions for both the targeting countries and the nontargeters. In some cases the targeters improved by more; for example, average inflation fell by a larger amount. However, these differences are explained by the facts that targeters performed worse than non-targeters before the early 90s, and there is regression to the mean. Once one controls for regression to the mean, there is no evidence that inflation targeting improves performance.
"The performance of inflation-targeting regimes has been quite good. Inflation-targeting countries seem to have significantly reduced both the rate of inflation and inflation expectations beyond that which would likely have occurred in the absence of inflation targets." (Mishkin, 1999, p. 595) [The U.K. data show] "that not only has inflation been lower since inflation targeting was introduced, but that, as measured by its standard deviation, it has also been more stable than in recent decades. Moreover, inflation has been less persistentin the sense that shocks to inflation die away more quicklyunder inflation targeting than for most of the past century." (King, 2002, p. 2) .
" [O] ne of the main benefits of inflation targets is that they may help to "lock in" earlier disinflationary gains, particularly in the face of one-time inflationary shocks. We saw this effect, for example, following the exits of the United Kingdom and Sweden from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism and after Canada's 1991 imposition of the Goods and Services Tax. In each case, the reigniting of inflation seems to have been avoided by the announcement of inflation targets that helped to anchor the public's inflation expectations and to give an explicit plan for and direction to monetary policy." (Bernanke et al., 1999, p. 288) .
I. INTRODUCTION
Economists have long sought the ideal framework for monetary policy. Since the early 1990s, many have come to believe they have finally found the right approach: inflation targeting.
Proponents of this policy cite many benefits. Inflation targeting solves the dynamic consistency problem that produces high average inflation. It reduces inflation variability, and if "flexible" it can stabilize output as well (Svensson, 1997) .
Targeting locks in expectations of low inflation, which reduces the inflationary impact of macroeconomic shocks. For these reasons, many economists advocate inflation targeting for the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. This paper attempts to measure the effects of inflation targeting on macroeconomic performance. We examine twenty OECD countries, seven that adopted inflation targeting during the 1990s and thirteen that did not. Not surprisingly, economic performance varies greatly across individual countries, both targeters and non-targeters. But on average, there is no evidence that inflation targeting improves performance as measured by the behavior of inflation, output, or interest rates.
If we examine inflation-targeting countries alone, we see that their performance improved on average between the period before targeting and the targeting period. For example, inflation fell and became more stable, and output growth also stabilized. However, countries that did not adopt inflation targeting also experienced improvements around the same times as targeters. This finding suggests that better performance resulted from something other than targeting.
For some performance measures, both inflation targeters and non-targeters improve over time, but the improvements are larger for targeters. For example, average inflation fell for both groups between the pre-targeting and targeting periods, but the average for targeters went from above that of non-targeters to roughly the same. Similar findings have led authors such as Neumann and von Hagen (2002) to argue that inflation targeting promotes "convergence": it helps poorly-performing countries catch up with countries that are already doing well. Our results, however, do not support even this modest claim of benefits from targeting. For many measures of performance, we find strong evidence of generic regression to the mean. Just as short people on average have children who are taller than they are, countries with unusually high and unstable inflation tend to see these problems diminish, regardless of whether they adopt inflation targeting. Once we control for this effect, the apparent benefits of targeting disappear.
The rest of this paper comprises eight sections. Section 2 describes the countries and sample periods that we study, and Section 3 describes our methodology for measuring the effects of inflation targeting.
Sections 4 and 5 present our results concerning inflation and output growth. We estimate the effects of inflation targeting on these variables' average levels, variability, and persistence. There are occasional hints that targeting has beneficial effects and occasional hints of adverse effects, but overall it appears that targeting does not matter. Section 7 investigates the effects of targeting on several bivariate relations: the slope of the output-inflation tradeoff, the inflationary effect of supply shocks (specifically changes in commodity prices), and the effect of inflation movements on expectations (as measured by OECD inflation forecasts). Here the results are imprecise, as it is difficult to estimate these relations over the short periods for which we have observed inflation targeting. However, the results suggest again that targeting has no important effects.
Section 8 compares our results to previous cross-country studies of inflation targeting. Finally, Section 9 interprets our results. To be clear, we do not present a case against inflation targeting. We do not find that targeting does anything harmful, and we can imagine future circumstances in which it might be beneficial. Our results suggest, however, that no major benefits have occurred so far.
II. THE SAMPLE
This section describes the countries in our sample and the inflation-targeting and non-targeting periods that we examine.
A. Targeters and Non-Targeters
We examine major developed, moderate-inflation economies.
Specifically, we start with all members of the OECD as of 1990
(thus excluding the emerging-market economies that have joined since then). We delete countries that lacked an independent currency before the Euro (Luxembourg) or have experienced annual inflation over 20% since 1984 (Greece, Iceland, and Turkey). We are left with twenty countries, which are listed in Table I. Previous macroeconomic studies using the same sample of countries include Layard et al. (1991) and Ball (1997) .
Seven of the countries in our sample adopted inflation targeting before 1999: Australia, Canada, Finland, Spain, Sweden, U.K., and New Zealand. For each country, we define the beginning of targeting as the first full quarter in which a specific inflation target or target range was in effect, and the target had been announced publicly at some earlier time. This definition of targeting is more stringent than that of previous authors, such as Bernanke et al. (1999) and Scheater et al. (2000) . These authors often date the start of targeting at the point when targets were first announced, even if they were implemented with a delay. In other cases, targeting is said to begin when the central bank retrospectively said it did, even though it was not announced at the time. Our view is that many of the intended effects of targeting, such as those working through expectations, depend on agents knowing that they are currently in a targeting regime.
As an example of our dating, consider Sweden. Sweden announced its shift to inflation targeting during 1993, so Bernanke et al. and Scheater et al. date the regime from then.
However, the first announced target was 2 percent for inflation over the twelve months to December 1995. We choose the first quarter of this period, 1995:1, as the beginning of the targeting regime. Table I gives Table II gives details of our dating.
Of the thirteen non-targeting countries, eight joined the Euro in 1999. Previously, these countries were part of the European Monetary System, so their monetary policies focused on fixing exchange rates and meeting convergence criteria. Two of the non-targeters, Germany and Switzerland (one also in the EMS), followed policies based on money-supply targets. The remaining four countries did not follow any announced rule -they pursued 1 In addition, we tried adding a Euro dummy to all of our cross-country regressions. This variable is usually insignificant. The only exception is that Euro countries experienced larger falls in the standard deviation of output growth between the pre-and post-targeting periods. Including the Euro dummy never changes our findings about the effects of inflation targeting. 8 the policy of "just do it" (Mishkin, 1999) . In the results we report, we lump all non-targeting countries together and compare them to targeters. We have checked, however, whether there are systematic differences in performance among the non-targeting groups, and fail to find any. We have also performed our comparisons of targeters and non-targeters excluding all Euro countries (which leaves five targeters and five non-targeters).
This produces no noteworthy changes in results.
B. Constant Targeting
In addition to studying inflation-targeting periods, we examine periods in which countries are constant inflation targeters, meaning they have an unchanging target or target range. In some countries the target is always constant, but in others the constant-targeting period is preceded by a transitional period in which the target exceeds its final level.
We examine constant-targeting periods because some benefits of targeting might not arise if the target changes. For example, proponents of targeting argue that it reduces the persistence of 2 For New Zealand, we date the constant-targeting period from 1993:1 to the end of the sample even though the target range was widened from 0-2% to 0-3% in 1997. The half-point change in the midpoint was smaller (and of the opposite sign) than the target changes during transitional periods in other countries. In our judgement the 1997 episode was not a substantial change in policy.
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inflation movements, but a changing target causes permanent changes in inflation. 
III. METHODOLOGY
We want to determine how inflation targeting (or constant targeting) affects dimensions of economic performance such as inflation, output growth, and interest rates. We examine each aspect of performance in turn, using a consistent methodology to measure the effects of targeting. Here we describe the methodology.
Suppose we are interested in how targeting affects a variable X --for example, X might be the average level of inflation or the variance of output growth. We first calculate X for each of our 20 countries in each of our six sample periods.
Then, for each period, we calculate the average value of X for inflation targeters and non-targeters (or, for samples 4 through 6, constant targeters and non-constant targeters). These averages show whether X differs systematically across periods or across targeters and non-targeters.
As we have mentioned, many measures of economic performance improved on average between the pre-inflation-targeting and posttargeting periods. In most major economies, the period since the early 1990s has seen low and stable inflation and stable output growth. If we examine inflation targeting countries alone, there are clear economic improvements that one might be tempted to attribute to targeting. However, to learn the true effects of targeting, we must compare improvements in targeting countries to improvements in non-targeting countries.
As a first pass at this comparison, we use a standard "differences in differences" approach. For our sample of twenty countries, we run the regression However, a problem arises because of regression to the mean.
Poor performers in the pre-targeting period tend to improve more than good performers simply because initial performance depends partly on transitory factors. If inflation targeters are poor initial performers, they will improve more than non-targeters, even if targeting does not affect performance. The coefficient on the targeting dummy can be significant, producing a spurious conclusion that targeting matters.
As an analogy, consider the behavior of Major League batting averages. Suppose a crackpot sports consultant suggests that a hitter will perform better if he sleeps next to his bat at night.
In reality, this idea does not work. Most .300 hitters merely chuckle at the consultant, but .220 hitters are desperate enough to try anything, and start taking their bats to bed. Because of regression to the mean, the low-average hitters who sleep with their bats will tend to improve more than the high-average hitters who leave their bats in their lockers. If the sports consultant regresses the change in a player's average on a batin-bed dummy, he will find a significant effect. He will claim incorrectly that the evidence supports his theory.
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For readers who prefer math to baseball, the Appendix to this paper formalizes our argument. We assume that the variable X depends on a country effect, a period effect, a country-period effect, and possibly an inflation-targeting dummy. The presence of the country-period effect generates regression to the mean.
If X pre is correlated with the targeting dummy, as happens in practice, then regression (1) produces a biased estimate of the dummy coefficient.
Fortunately, there is a simple way to eliminate this bias:
add the initial value of X to the differences regression. That is, we run (2) X post -X pre = a o + a 1 D + a 2 X pre + e .
Including X pre controls for regression to the mean. The coefficient on the dummy now shows whether targeting affects a country's change in performance for a given initial performance.
If a 1 is significant, then a targeter with poor initial performance improves more than a non-targeter with equally poor initial performance. This difference implies a true effect of targeting.
Once again, the Appendix formalizes our argument. Under the assumptions we make there, regression (2) produces an unbiased estimate of the dummy coefficient.
IV . INFLATION
In a recent speech, the next Governor of the Bank of England posed the question "Ten Years of the Inflation Target: what has it achieved?" As quoted at the start of this paper, he suggests that targeting has reduced the average level, variability, and persistence of U.K. inflation. In contrast, we find little evidence in cross-country data that targeting has any of these effects.
A. Average Inflation Looking ahead, however, we will see that this result is one of 
B. Inflation Variability
Tables IV and V examine the variability of inflation, using the same format as the average-inflation table. Table IV presents standard deviations of quarterly inflation, and Table V presents standard deviations of "trend inflation," defined as a nine-quarter moving average. We examine trend inflation because targeters might stabilize this variable even if they cannot smooth out higher-frequency inflation shocks.
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There is no evidence whatsoever that inflation targeting reduces inflation variability. The standard deviations of inflation and trend inflation fall for all groups of countries during the targeting period. At all times, the standard deviations are lower for non-targeters than for targeters.
Equation 1 suggests that targeters experience larger falls in standard deviations, but this result disappears when equation 2 controls for regression to the mean.
In fact, Table IV suggests that, controlling for regression to the mean, inflation targeting raises the standard deviation of inflation. This effect is sometimes statistically significant. Nonetheless, this perverse result is likely a fluke (given the number of regressions we run, our tests should produce some Type I errors). Our robust finding is that inflation targeting has no beneficial effects.
C. Inflation Persistence
Finally, we examine the persistence of inflation movements.
For each country and sample period, we estimate an AR-4 model for quarterly inflation. Then, for each period, we average each AR 5 Note that the impulse responses for targeters in samples 3 and 6 are negative at some lags. We have checked the statistical significance of the negative responses with Monte Carlo experiments, following Sheridan (2001) . The only response that is significantly negative is the response for CIT countries in period t+4. We are inclined to dismiss the negative responses as a fluke, because they are not plausible theoretically. "A conservative conclusion is that, once low inflation is achieved, inflation targeting is not harmful to the real economy. Given the strong economic growth after disinflation was achieved in many countries that have adopted inflation targets, New Zealand being one outstanding example, a case can be made that inflation targeting promotes real economic growth in addition to controlling inflation." (p. 597)
Here we examine this idea, with inconclusive results. short-term interest rates (i.e. Taylor rules). In practice, it appears difficult to get meaningful estimates of these equations with the short samples at hand. We therefore examine a cruder measure of policy behavior, the standard deviation of short-term rates. Differences in policy rules should affect this statistic.
For example, if inflation targeters respond more strongly to inflation movements, then short-term rates should become more volatile (unless targeting stabilizes inflation, an effect we fail to find). 6 We examine the volatility of short-term rates at the quarterly frequency. Our data are interbank rates from the IFS (Line 60b). We examine only the shorter of our pre-targeting samples, the ones starting in 1985, because consistent data are not available before then. For once, we throw out a few troublesome outliers. For all countries, we delete the three quarters of the ERM crisis, 1992:3 through 1993:1, when interest rates jumped to very high levels.
The results, in Table IX , follow the pattern we have seen again and again. Interest-rate volatility is lower for nontargeters than for targeters and falls over time for both groups.
The decrease appears larger for targeters if we ignore regression to the mean, but not if we control for it.
VII. BIVARIATE RESULTS
So far we have examined the univariate behavior of inflation, output, and interest rates. In principle, we would like to look more deeply at whether inflation targeting changes the structure of the economy. For our short samples, however, it is impractical to estimate sophisticated structural equations.
Here we take one step beyond our univariate analysis by examining several bivariate relations.
8 In principle, the optimal estimators of the group means and equation (1) use weights that depend on both the variances of the coefficient estimates and the variances of true coefficients across countries in a group. Using the residuals from our cross-country regressions, we have estimated the variances of true coefficients, and find they are small. We therefore set these variances to zero and derive the optimal weights based on the variances of coefficient estimates. These weights are the ones described in the text. This means that a ten percent rise in the relative price of commodities raises inflation by five tenths of a percentage point. For the IT period (sample 3), the coefficient is 0.006.
In contrast, there is no evidence that inflation targeting affects the coefficients that we consider. In the twelve regressions in Table X , the targeting dummy is never significant at the ten percent level.
VIII: COMPARISON TO OTHER STUDIES
The closest study to ours is that of Neumann and von Hagen.
Their paper and ours have the same title. Part of their paper, like this one, compares the volatility of inflation, output, and interest rates across time periods and groups of countries. But
Neumann and von Hagen's conclusion differs from ours: "Taken together, the evidence confirms the claim that IT matters" (p.
144).
Our study differs from Neumann and von Hagen in many details, but the crucial difference may be our treatment of regression to the mean. After the sentence quoted above, they continue: "Adopting this policy has permitted IT countries to reduce inflation to low levels and curb the volatility of inflation and interest rates; in so doing, these banks have been able to approach the stability achieved by the Bundesbank" (Neumann and von Hagen's main example of a non-inflation targeter). We, too, find that targeters have caught up with nontargeters along some dimensions, but this convergence was not caused by targeting.
A number of other studies report evidence that inflation targeting matters. For example, researchers report that targeting steepens the Phillips curve (Clifton et al., 2001) ;
that it dampens movements in expected inflation (Sheridan, 2001) ;
and that it increases the predictability of inflation (Corbo et al., 2002) . States and other non-targeters (e.g. Svensson, 1997; Ball, 1999) .
Indeed, observers have suggested that the U.S. is a "covert inflation targeter" (Mankiw, 2001 ). The first target, announced in December 1994, was for yearover-year inflation of 3.5-4% "by early 1996." Sweden Q1 1995 Q1 1995 The Riksbank announced in January 1993 that it aimed "to limit the annual increase in the consumer price index from 1995 onwards to 2 percent." This target applied to inflation over all of 1995, not to year-over-year inflation at the start of 1995 (Svensson, 1995) . Q1 1993 Q1 1993 In October 1992 the Bank of England announced a 2.5% target, beginning immediately.
United Kingdom
Non-IT countries Q3 1993 Q1 1994 The starting dates were computed as averages of the starting dates for inflation targeting or constant inflation targeting countries.
a Spain is an inflation targeter but not a constant inflation targeter. Q1 1994 is the start date of the constant-targeting period for nonconstant targeters. Equation 1 Equation 2 Inflation targeting dummy Equation 1 Equation 2 Inflation targeting dummy Inflation targeting dummy Inflation targeting dummy Inflation targeting dummy Inflation targeting dummy Response over time of quarterly inflation to a unit shock to inflation
